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The Dynamics of Forced Neoliberalism in
Nigeria Since the 1980s
Victor Olumide Ekanade
Redeemer’s University, Nigeria
Abstract: Over the last 30 years, the logic of market liberalization has
increasingly permeated the social and economic facets of political and
economic discourse to such an extent that the core values about the
responsibilities and obligations of nation-states to their citizens have
been strained. The welfarist ethos featuring in the public finance of some
European and North American countries for much of the twentieth
century included values such as equity and access, which manifested
in the subsidization and aﬀordability of social amenities. The welfarist
concept, premised on the experience of western European economies,
was based on the logic that if a large proportion of the population could
not aﬀord clean water, health care, or education for their children,
long-term corporate interests of the society would be undermined.
State-subsidized provision of these essentials was thus fully embraced
because of the understanding of the short and long-term public interest
involved. However, by the 1980s, changes in international markets
fostered a precipitous decline in African economies. Many governments
thus jettisoned its state-centered economic strategy since it could no
longer fund public expenditure on sustainable basis. Nowhere was the
shift in economic policy more pronounced as in Nigeria. The drastic
decline in national revenue due to a dip in international price of oil
led to Nigeria’s balance of payment deficit making the introduction of
forced neoliberal economic policy inevitable. Analyzing the dynamics
of policy formulation and implementation since the 1980s, this article
argues that Nigeria’s uncritical embrace of Western-styled neoliberal
economic policy largely undermined the country’s quest for a
sustainable economic development.
Keywords: Nigeria; Neoliberalism; Social Welfare; Democracy; Poverty;
Military Regimes; Economic Reforms; Privatization; Corruption.

Introduction
Nigeria’s experience with neoliberal economic policy presents a classic example
of a state which progressively shifted from a relative welfare state to ad-hoc
welfarist state and full blown free market economy. The implementation of
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in the country between 1986 and early
1990s, in addition to neoliberal policies under civil regimes from 1999 until the
present, have had colossal implications for Nigeria’s national development. In
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this neoliberal context, democracy was re-established to satisfy market demands
without adequate regard to social needs. Neoliberal reforms were not concerned
with social issues but with market eﬃciency, which worked against the basic
tenets of human rights and constitutional safeguards for Nigerian citizens. Forced
neoliberalism is state policy foisted on the people in a democracy without their
due consent. This practice is typical of politics in post-colonial Africa.
Neoliberal economic policies and profound internal socio-political
convulsions are challenging African states, including Nigeria. Even though they
are acknowledged as independent states within the global community, African
countries have not adequately established themselves as nations with national
identities. They also have not conquered the challenges of good governance and
gained their economic autonomy. The post-Westphalian states of Europe treat
African states as dependent associates, providing them with financial aid through
international agencies such as the Bretton Woods institutions.1 Nigeria for instance
is a subordinate unit responsive to the policies of international organizations, and
subject to the imposition of their programs such as the World Bank’s SAPs based
on neoliberal principles.2 The SAP instituted in Nigeria in 1986 under General
Ibrahim Babangida proved dreadful in terms of implementation and outcomes as
it led to a drop in the standard of living of the majority of Nigerians as subsidies
on essential commodities and services were removed, provoking a series of
devastating riots. Furthermore, the outcomes of neoliberal policies established
with the return of democratic regime of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, between 1999
and 2007, were also disappointing. As a democratic regime, it was expected that
the Obasanjo government would create conditions aimed at reducing poverty
and inequality. Rather the established democracy abided with market standards
without due consideration for the needs of the citizenry. This article examines
the contradiction of the institutionalization of democracy in Nigeria as a moral
value while at the same time negating the social rights of its citizens. It argues
that the growth of electoral democracy occurred at the same time of heightened
social problems in the country, and shows how neoliberalism since 1999 worsened
the plight of a large segment of the Nigerian population, deepening poverty,
inequality, unemployment, and social exclusion.

1

George Clement Bond, “Globalization, Neoliberalism, Historical Conditionalities,” The
Journal of African American History 88, no. 4 (Autumn, 2003): 330. Peter Lewis, “From
Prebendalsim to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria,” The Journal of
Modern African Studies 34 no.1 (Mar, 1996), 81.
2
Babawale Tunde and Onuoha Browne, “The State Corruption and the Challenges of Good
Governance,” in Rich but Poor, Corruption and Good governance in Nigeria, ed. Lai Olurode
and Remi Anifowoshe (Lagos: University of Lagos, 2005), 64.
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Conceptual Framework
The received wisdom in literature on neoliberalism in Africa and Latin America as
posited by Graham Harrison, George Clement Bond, Margaret Hanson and James
Hentz, Adebayo Olukoshi, Chibuzo Nwoke, and Pablo Gonzalez Casanova is that
the failure of leadership in these continents and the need to revamp their distressed
economies necessitated the introduction of neoliberal policies in the polities.3
This amounts to a misreading of these societies, especially African states where
neoliberalism is fundamentally in disharmony with African communal ways of
life but finds relevance in the socialist mode of production. Another consensus in
literature is that structural adjustment and neoliberal policies imposed on Africa
and Latin America all carry a specific political and economic principle that is
decisively anti-people- anti working class but pro-private capital. One of the many
tragedies of neoliberalism is that in its bid to promote the forces of the market and
long term interests of the private capitalist class, systematic assaults have been
launched on the African and Latin American states’ welfare, social, and public
expenditure programs, which have in turn resulted in backlash. Thus it cannot
be assumed that developmental needs of the state and citizenry will be served by
simply turning to the market. The body of literature mentioned above does not
however explain how neoliberalism interacted with the democratization process,
corruption, and constitutional provisions in these states. This is a gap this article
will attempt to fill in, using the context of the Nigerian state.
According to Adejumobi Said, historically the provision of social welfare
services has been a state responsibility in both developed and developing
countries. However the introduction of privatization, which was meant to help
curtail government expenditure, creates new social problems or exacerbates
existing ones which would require supplementary public spending in order
to contain them.4 For Jarret Alfred5 and Claude Ake,6 colonialism left behind a
legacy of a social welfare system irrelevant to the social needs of the masses in
Nigeria, as it was structured for profit maximization and essentially designed to
3
Graham Harrison, “Economic Faith, Social Project and a Misreading of African Society;
the Travails of Neoliberalism in Africa,” Third World Quarterly 26, no, 8 (2005): 1303-1320;
Bond; Margaret Hanson and James Hentz, “Neocolonialism and Neoliberalism in South
Africa and Zambia,” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 3 (1999): 479-502; Olukoshi Adebayo
and Chibuzo. N. Nwoke, “The Theoretical and Conceptual Underpinnings of Structural
Adjustment Programmes” in Structural Adjustment in West Africa, eds. Olukoshi Adebayo,
Omotayo Olaniyan and Femi Aribisala (Lagos: NIIA, 1994), 11-27.
4
Adejumobi Said, “Privatisation Policy and the Delivery of Social Welfare Services in
Africa: A Nigerian Example,” Journal of Social Development in Africa 14, no. 2 (1999): 87-108.
5
Alfred A. Jarrett, “Problems and Prospects of the Social Welfare Systems of Sierra Leone
and Nigeria,” International Social Work 34, no. 2 (April, 1991): 143-157.
6
Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (New York: Longman, 1981).
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meet not the needs of the colony but those of the colonial masters. Thus it did not
encourage investment in social welfare schemes for the African population. After
independence, Nigeria inherited the outdated social welfare system left behind
by the colonial order. This had serious implications for structural adaptation, cost
eﬃciency, and eﬀectiveness of these public corporations in terms of delivery of
welfare services since most of the public corporations were centrally controlled.
For Arowosegbe Jeremiah, the inherent character of the “imported state,” oriented
exclusively towards maintenance of law and order, explains the overdeveloped
status of the state’s apparatuses of violence, which was a tool for maximizing
colonial exploitation, relative to its educational, health, and other welfare systems.
Local elites under successive regimes in Nigeria have not innovatively engaged
with reinventing the state but have continued along the same trajectory. 7

Historical Background of Neo-liberalism
Neoliberalism is rooted in the classical liberal ideas of Adam Smith and David
Ricardo. Both viewed the market as a self-regulating mechanism tending towards
equilibrium of supply and demand, thus securing the most eﬃcient allocation
of resources. These British economists and philosophers considered that any
constraint on free competition would interfere with the natural eﬃciency of market
mechanisms, inevitably leading to social stagnation, political corruption, and the
creation of unresponsive state bureaucracies.8 In modern times, neoliberalism
emerged as a synonym for the mainly externally directed attempt to remove the
state from the economy. The World Bank’s Berg Report claimed that many of
Africa’s economic problems emanated from excessive ineﬃcient state intervention
in the economy.9
Neoliberalism is steeped in a system of economic, social, and political
ideals that are rightwing versions of the modern post-enlightenment themes of
rationality, democracy, and individual freedom. Neoclassical economics rethought
these eighteenth and nineteenth century principles of economic modernism and
for a while reluctantly abandoned pure market determination for limited state
regulation during the Keynesian interlude of post-war period. During the 1970’s
when widespread problems of stagflation were deemed beyond the reach of
Keynesian fiscal policy, nineteenth century liberalism was revived as a rightwing

7

Jeremiah Arowosegbe, “Claude Ake: Political Integration and the Challenges of
Nationhood in Africa,” Development and Change 42, no. 1 (January, 2011): 349-365.
8
Steger Manfred, Globalization: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003).
9
Harrison, “Economic Faith, Social Project,” 1303-1304.
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version of neoliberalism.10
Neoliberalism now emerged as monetarism in the 1970s, a reflection of the
triumph in the west of the monetarist shade of neo-classical economics, which
was against Keynesianism and all it stood for. Monetarism is essentially about
ascendency of the market and “peripheralization” of the state, which in the
monetarists’ view had become too large, unfit and ineﬃcient, and excessively
interventionist. As part of the eﬀort to reduce the size and role of the state, they
called for the withdrawal of a host of subsidies that were introduced at the height
of the Keynesian revolution, the elimination of subventions to public enterprises
and privatization of those enterprises.11
The globalization of the monetarist agenda was skillfully assisted with the
coming to power in the early 1980s of conservative governments dedicated to the
cause of monetarism in the leading western countries that dominate the world
capitalist economy. The most prominent of these governments were those of
Margaret Thatcher in Britain, Ronald Reagan in the United States, Helmut Kohl in
West Germany, and later Brian Mulroney in Canada.12 They all dismantled their
welfare states in response to the global economic crisis of the 1970’s, the rising costs
of labor in Europe and USA, and the rapid development of capitalism in newly
industrialized countries (NICs) of Asia that led to increased competition, reduced
profit rate, and the crises of overproduction. The resultant eﬀect of the emergence
of these rightwing governments, unrepentant in the pursuit of monetarism, was
the reorientation of the dominant outlook within the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and World Bank. These two key institutions shed their Keynesian toga and
embraced monetarist principles.13
The outcome of this reorientation in the IMF and World Bank had fundamental
and colossal consequences for developing countries. By 1983/1984, the African
debt crisis was serious as debt servicing alone consumed about a third of all their
foreign receipts and moved them into severe depression.14 Thus, the World Bank
and IMF were able to use the debt crisis in Africa to gain substantial leverage over
10
Elaine Hartwick and Richard Peet, “Rethinking Sustainable Development: Neoliberalism
and Nature: The case of the WTO,” Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science
590 (November, 2003): 188-211.
11
Adebayo and Chibuzo, “The Theoretical and Conceptual Underpinnings of Structural
Adjustment Programmes,” 14.
12
Rick Rowden, “An Overview of the Increased Coordination of the International Monetary
Fund, World Bank and World Trade, Trade Liberalization Policies,” 2nd draft working paper,
Washington DC, October, 2009.
13
Adebayo and Nwoke, “The Theoretical and Conceptual Underpinnings of Structural
Adjustment programme,”14-15.
14
Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa’s Economic Stagnation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), 24.

Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/

6 | Ekanade
economic policies in Africa which hitherto was limited. In their attempt to come
to terms with the crisis of their local economies, developing countries approached
the World Bank and IMF for financial aid, giving the United States the chance to
sell them the Brady Plan.15 Western countries that dominate these financial bodies
such as the United States not only ensured that the two institutions fell in line with
their new economic thinking but also encouraged them to make the acceptance
and implementation of market reforms a pre-condition for financial assistance
to debtor nations.16 Given the comatose state of most post-colonial third world
economies, they embraced the new policies and conditions. The 1980s was the era
of monetarists’ domination of economic policies in the third world. The IMF and
the World Bank eﬀectively imposed their policies of SAP as a panacea of economic
transformation throughout developing countries, including Nigeria.

Nigeria’s Experience with Structural Adjustment
As a major oil-producing nation, Nigeria enjoyed almost a decade of unprecedented
revenue boom arising from the petroleum price increases of the 1970’s. One
remarkable characteristic of Nigeria’s expenditure during this period was its
“welfarist” orientation with government domestic investments and concentrated
provision of a massive transport system, road networks, public buildings, and
health infrastructure. Employment rates soared, coupled with increases in
subsidies on food, transport, health, fuel, and education.17 The Shehu Shagari
regime (1979-1983) systematized the subsidized sale and distribution of specific
commodities known as essential commodities to Nigerians. These included
rice, milk, beef, sugar, among other items. These products were imported by the
Nigerian government through the Nigerian National Supply Company and sold
to Nigerians at rates below prevailing market prices. These subsidies remained
all through the Shagari era but terminated with the introduction of SAPs in
1986, which led to the removal of subsidies, reduction of public expenditures,
15
John T. Rourke, International Politics on World Stage (New York: Mc Graw Hill, 2000),
467- 468. The Brady Plan emphasized that bank creditors should grant debt relief to debtor
states in exchange for greater assurance of collectability in the form of principal and
interest collateral. Also, debt relief for debtor states needed to be linked to some assurance
of economic reform and the resulting debt should be highly tradeable to allow creditors
to diversify risk more widely throughout the financial and investment community.
See EMTA, “The Brady Plan,” accessed April 22, 2013, http://www.emta.org/template.
aspx?id=35&terms=brady+plan.
16
David .K. Leonard and Scott Strauss, Africa’s Stalled Development: International Causes
and Cures (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2003), 25-26. See also Elmar Alvater,
“Postneoliberalism or Postcapitalism? The Failure of Neoliberalism in the Financial Market
Crisis,” Development Dialogue Uppsala no. 51 (January, 2009): 73-88.
17
Thandika Mkandawire, “Fiscal Structure, State Contraction and Political Responses from
Africa,” in Between Liberalisation and Oppression: The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa,
eds. Mkandiawire Thandika and Olukoshi Adebayo (Dakar: Codesria, 1995), 37.
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privatization, and devaluation of domestic currency.18
Part of the reason for the introduction of SAPs was the economic decline that
started in the early 1980s. The international source of the crisis was the dramatic
flagging of the oil markets in the first half of the 1980s, which made the country’s
financial position deteriorate. Export revenues plunged by 53 percent between
1980 and 1982, from US$27.1 billion to US$12.7 billion.19 At the same time, the
value of internal public debt increased by 72 percent from US$8.5 billion in 1979
to $26.9 billion in 1983 while external debt was estimated at $14.13 billion during
this period.20 As commitments accumulated, short-term borrowing increased, and
interest rates escalated. On the domestic scene, the downturn was accentuated by
the monocultural nature of the economy, the character of the politicians during the
return of the civilian governments in the early 1908s, who were flippant with federal
funds, and the endemic corruption of the same class and gross mismanagement of
the national treasury. The crisis raised questions of sustainability of state subsidy
as social services suﬀered due to underfunding. The industrial sector shut down 50
percent of its firms and thousands of its workers were laid oﬀ.21 These multifaceted
crises provided the immediate domestic context for the adoption by the Nigerian
state of an orthodox program of structural adjustment sponsored by the Bretton
Woods institutions.22
The first serious attempt to examine the role of the state in the Nigerian
economy came in 1981 when the Shehu Shagari regime appointed a presidential
commission of inquiry to examine the parastatals. The commission’s report
recommended an increased role for the private sector in administering the partially
government-owned organizations. This recommendation was to cut government
expenditure at the expense of the masses. In the context of the debt problems, the
Shagari administration in April 1982 introduced the Economic Stabilization Act to
control imports, introduce more discipline into the monetary system, and narrow
the gap between public expenditure and income through cuts in government
18

Ikubolajeh, Logan and Kidane Mengisteab, “Introduction,” in Beyond Economic
Liberalization in Africa: Structural Adjustments and Alternatives, eds. Kidane Mengisteab and
Ikubolajeh Logan (London: Zed, 1995), 3.
19
Lewis Peter, “The Dysfunctional State of Nigeria,” in Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and Poorly
Performing States, eds. Nancy Birdsall, Milan Vaishnav, and Robert L. Ayres (Washington
D.C: Center for Global Development 2006), 83-116.
20
James Guseh and Emmanuel Oritsejafor, “Government Size, Political Freedom and
Economic Growth in Nigeria, 1960-2000,” Journal of Third World Studies xxiv, no 1 ( 2007):
142.
21
Olukoshi Adebayo, “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,” in Between
Liberalisation and Oppression: The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa, eds. P. Thandika
Mkandiawire and Adebayo Olukoshi (Dakar: Codesria, 1995), 163-164.
22
Adebayo Olukoshi, “From Crisis to Adjustment in Nigeria,” in The Politics of Structural
Adjustment in Nigeria (London: James Currey and Heinemann, 1993), 1.
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expenditure.23 The stabilization program failed because the regime was reluctant
to remove subsidies and commercialize public enterprises. Many stalwarts of the
ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) owed their enormous wealth to their direct
control over the parastatals, marketing of rice, fertilizer, and petroleum products.24
Consequently, the Shagari government approached the IMF for an extended fund
facility of between N1.9 and N2.4 billion. The IMF insisted on certain conditions
including privatization, a curb on government spending, trade liberalization,
and introduction of sales tax. 25 No concrete agreement was reached with the IMF
before the government was overthrown on December 31, 1983. 26
The successive regime of Muhammadu Buhari agreed with the IMF on
the need for fundamental reforms in the Nigerian economy but was unwilling
to accept part of the IMF’s recommendations such as currency devaluation,
privatization, liberalization of trade, and withdrawal of the petroleum subsidy.
It nevertheless embraced the policy of commercialization but insisted on state
regulations. This resulted in a stalemate and the outcome was the tightening of
the boycott of Nigeria by western banks and export credit guarantee agencies. The
leading financial institutions insisted that the government had to obtain a clean
bill of health from the IMF before the country’s debt, put at about $20 billion in
1984, could be rescheduled and fresh capital injections authorized.27 The second
approach adopted by Buhari’s government, in its bid to mitigate the eﬀects of
the disparate pressing demands by the IMF and Nigerians on the economy, was
the introduction of the policy of counter trade, a modern day variant of trade by
barter, with Brazil and some West European states. The scale of the counter trade
deals was however too small and costly relative to the magnitude of the country’s
economic problems28 Thus, the regime introduced a comprehensive package of
austerity measures as part of its own stabilization eﬀorts with severe restriction
23
Adebayo Olukoshi, “The Management of Nigeria’s External Debt: Issues and
Problems” in Nigerian External Debt Crisis: Its Management, ed. Adebayo Olukoshi (Lagos:
Malthouse,1990), 31.
24
Ibid. See also Adebayo Olukoshi and Tajudeen Abdulraheem, “Nigeria, Crisis
Management under the Buhari Administration,” Review of African Political Economy no. 34
(1985): 95-96.
25
Robert. H. Bates, John H. Coates and Jeﬀrey G. Williamson, “Lost Decades; Lessons from
Post-Independence Latin America for Today’s Africa,” NBER Working Paper 12610, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts (2006), 20.
26
Yahaya Sheu, “State Versus Market: The Privatization Program of the Nigerian State,”
in The Politics of Structural Adjustment, ed. Adebayo Olukoshi (London: James Currey and
Heinemann, 1993), 17-18.
27
Adebayo Olukoshi, “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,” 170-171. See also
Yahaya Sheu, “State Versus Market: The Privatization Programme of the Nigerian State,” in
The Politics of Structural Adjustment, 17-19.
28
Olukoshi, “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,” 170-171.
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on imports. This made it diﬃcult for local industries to procure essential imported
raw materials forcing many of them to close shop. Subsequently, many workers
were laid oﬀ, and the government itself retrenched many employees to increase its
“cost eﬀectiveness.” All of these actions were accompanied by high inflation. The
price of basic food items rose, and life became increasingly diﬃcult for the masses
and even the aﬄuent.29
Adequate health care is critical for the worker to maintain his productivity
while education is important in order to improve the quality of that productivity.
Cost recovery measures introduced in health and education sectors by the Buhari
regime had a reverberating impact on the citizenry. The Nigerian constitution
stipulates that federal, state, and local governments should fund, in a coordinated
manner, a three-tier system of health care. However, total health expenditure
in real terms declined sharply from a total of N825.5 million in 1980 to N128.3
million in 1984 representing a fall of about eighty-five percent. The negative
impact of this manifested in the increase of the under five-year-old mortality
rate which moved from 181.1 per 1,000 live births in 1980 to 192.4 per 1,000 live
births in 1985.30 The illness rate in rural areas also approached 100 per thousand,
particularly among children and the aged people in the 1983-1984 period. The
education sector also worsened and with it came employees’ inability to benefit
from educational policy31. The total number of secondary schools in the country
fell from 38,211 in 1984 to 35,281 in 1985. In addition, the government imposed
heavy levies, indiscriminately on parents of school children. At the tertiary level,
the government withdrew the feeding program of students, thus increasing the
cost for students and their parents32 Buhari’s legitimacy was soon dissipated by
his authoritarian nature and he was deposed by General Ibrahim Babangida in

29
Peter Lewis, “From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in
Nigeria,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 34, no. 1 (Mar, 1996): 79-103. See also Adebayo
Olukoshi, “The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria,” 157-185. Between 1979 and
1989 the price of garri increased by 700 percent, rice by 1,700 percent, beans by 1,350 percent
yams 3,000 percent, frozen fish 900 percent, beer 350 percent milk 1,500 percent, bread 2,000
percent, and palm oil 300 percent. See The Financial Post, Lagos, October 1- 4, 1989, 9.
30
L.A Amaghionyeodiwe, “Fiscal Federalism, Health Care Spending and National
Development: The Nigerian Experience,” in Fiscal Federalism and Nigeria’s Economic
Development, ed., Ben
Aigbokhan (Ibadan: Nigerian Economic Society, 1999), 394. See also Nigeria Demographic
and Health Survey, 1990.
31
Ibeanu Okechukwu, “The Deteriorating Condition of The Nigerian Peasantry,” in DeadEnd to Nigerian Development: An Investigation on the Social, Economic and Political Crisis in
Nigeria, ed. Okwudiba Nnoli (Dakar: Codesria, 1993), 142.
32
Okwudiba Nnoli, “The Deteriorating Condition of the Nigerian Working Class,” in DeadEnd to Nigerian Development: An Investigation on the Social, Economic and Political Crisis in
Nigeria, 169.

Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/

10 | Ekanade
August, 1985.
In 1985, Nigeria was still reeling under a heavy debt burden with declining
oil revenues, and Babangida opened a national debate on whether Nigeria should
take the IMF loan or not and the role the government should play in managing the
economic crisis. The premeditated decision of the regime prevailed as Babangida,
despite the people’s protests, adopted a supposedly homegrown adjustment
program akin to the IMF prescriptions. It was obvious that the debate was a
smokescreen because Babangida had earlier appointed Chief Olu Falae, a pro-IMF
personality as the nation’s finance minister and Babangida himself had insisted on
the necessity to adjust the naira to its ‘realistic’ value.33 This was the SAP, which
Babangida claimed would halt economic stagnation and revitalize growth. The SAP
was a package of neoliberal economic reforms, primarily aimed at strengthening
market forces and retrenching the state. This had dire consequences for the Nigerian
political economy and its peoples, state, agriculture, and industry.34 For instance,
the public sector carried out its program of retrenchment through sackings and
various other means. One of these was to disband existing public enterprises such
as the Nigerian National Supply Company and the various commodity boards.
Another was to merge enterprises. Reorganization in corporations such as Nigeria
Railway Corporation, Nigeria Airways, and Nigeria Airport Authorities led to the
retrenchment of 8,000, 2,500, and 2,000 workers respectively in 1988. In same year,
1988, 32,000 workers in the textile industry were retrenched as spasmodic and
eventual permanent closure of industries ensued.35
Faced with ever declining standards of living and without resources that
formerly co-opted oppositions and nurtured clients, the state under General
Babangida increasingly relied on coercion to implement structural adjustment
plans.36 General Babangida sought to assuage popular opposition to adjustment
through selective provisioning of certain welfare facilities through institutions such
as Directorate for food, roads, and rural infrastructure (DFRRI) to provide special
assistance to rural areas, networks of Peopleand Community Banks to extend
credit to small scale and local borrowers. The Better Life Programme sponsored
by the First Lady was also intended to promote the production of craft works
33
Olukoshi Adebayo and Tajudeen Abdulraheem, “Nigeria, Crisis Management under the
Buhari Administration,” Review of African Political Economy 12, no. 34 (1985): 101.
34
Attahiru Jega, “The State and Identity Transformation under Structural Adjustment
in Nigeria,” in Identity Transformation and Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in
Nigeria. ed. Attahiru Jega, (Uppsala: Nordiska African Institute and Centre for Research
and Documentation, 2003), 31-33.
35
Okwudiba Nnoli, “The Deteriorating Condition of the Nigerian Working Class,” 162.
36
M. Paul Lubeck, “The Crisis of African Development: Conflicting Interpretations and
Resolutions,” Annual Review of Sociology, 18 (1992): 519-540.
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among the poor, especially women. These initiatives were mostly underfunded,
ephemeral, or suﬀused with corruption, and their impact on popular welfare was
questionable.37
Education was consistently underfunded at less than 6 percent of total
expenditure of the sector during this regime. In previous years though, especially
between 1978 and 1982 the federal government spent more than 6 percent of total
expenditure on the educational sector. However, in 1992, the federal government
spent less than 1 percent of its total expenditure on the sector.38 This had severe
repercussions for infrastructure, teaching, and research activities, and on the
quality of students produced. It aﬀected the morale of teachers who were owed
arrears of salaries for several months and who had to abandon their duties out
of necessity to seek other means of sustenance.39 Healthcare equally suﬀered due
to the withdrawal of subsidy from that sector under Babangida. Infant mortality
increased from 87.2 per 1,000 live births in 1985 to 191 per 100 live births in 1993
as access to safe water also diminished from 45 per 1,000 in 1985 to 40 per 1,000 in
1993 when he stepped aside. By 1991, debt servicing ate up 47 percent of the overall
federal budget and remained so in 1992 and 1993. By 1993, the deficit Babangida
accumulated was put at N90-N100 billion. The annual budget for that year was
N120 billion. One is left to wonder how a country that was adjusting could aﬀord to
amass huge deficit year after year, especially after 1989.40 Thus, the SAP rather than
helping to revamp the economy simply fed into the existing dynamic of decline,
thereby becoming an integral factor in the continuation of Nigeria’s economic
crisis. Cumulatively, the SAP produced considerable hardship, poverty, and
discontentment across the Nigerian society. The middle class was overwhelmed
by declining purchasing power and unemployment. Coping mechanisms for some
workers included running their private cars as taxis to augment income after the
day’s work, while low income urban dwellers were driven to subsistence levels
and school children had to hawk wares to supplement family incomes.41
The SAP was eventually discontinued in 1994 under the General Sani
Abacha regime as part of his legitimization schemes. It was replaced with a policy
37
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of guided deregulation meant to enhance economic development by appropriate
discretionary interventions from the government.42 According to Kunle Amuwo,
the Abacha regime actually favored a statist economic policy, but certainly not a
nationalist agenda. Amuwo noted further that “this way Abacha set the tone and
tenor to pocket the economy and privatize state finances.”43

Abacha, Neoliberalism, and the Nigerian Textile Industry
The application of neoliberal policies in the Nigerian textile sector can be used to
dramatize the government’s wholesale mortgage of indigenous industrial fortunes
and their potential benefits. General Sani Abacha compounded the economic
misfortunes of the Nigerian manufacturing sector by extending the frontiers of
the neoliberal agenda to the textile sector with his decision to take Nigeria into
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994 without providing safeguards.44
The WTO agreement opened Nigerian markets to all kinds of imported goods
and turned Nigeria into a dumping ground for frivolous imports. The agreement
was endorsed for political reasons – personally for Abacha to garner support and
sympathy from the international community, which had turned Nigeria into a
pariah state and perhaps to provide patronage for his cronies. No sooner had
Nigeria signed the WTO pact than Nigerian industries, including 135% textile
firms began crumbling like a pack of cards.45 The negative eﬀect of unbridled
importation subsequently led to a drastic decline in the contribution of the
manufacturing sector to Nigeria’s GDP.46 Cheap Chinese-made textiles against
which Nigerian firms could not favorably compete flooded Nigerian markets. Not
even the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) passed in the twilight
days of Clinton’s administration in the United States could reassure them.47 This
unbridled importation of textiles impoverished cotton farmers and brought untold
hardships on textile industry workers who were subsequently laid oﬀ because
locally produced textiles could not favorably compete with Chinese textiles which
were cheap.
No nation has developed without a textile industry. The textile industry
was one that set Britain on a path of sustainable economic growth in the mid
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nineteenth century. The textile industry uses relatively simple technology and it
is an industry well suited for Nigeria with its huge population and rich cotton
growing culture. Nigerian-made textiles had popularity in the export market and
gained prominence in places as distant as Dakar. In the mid-1980s, the industry
had about 350,000 people in over 200 mills. As of 2010, however, the Nigerian
textile industries had less than 2,000 persons in their employ.48 Nigeria’s public
enterprises were a serious drain on the national budget in the immediate postSAP years.49 Abacha did not change their fortunes in any positive way. According
to Kunle Amuwo, “a predatory regime like Abacha’s was characterized by a
distinctive pattern of economic management, including arbitrary change, deficit
financing, and capital flight. More importantly in the realm of social choice, the
“rationality” of the market was vitiated by the “logic” of rent seeking.50
The Abacha regime also made attempts to implement welfare policies and
programs to mitigate the adverse impact of its economic policy. A key model here
was the Petroleum Trust fund meant to rehabilitate public roads, fund education,
and provide critical infrastructure in the health sector. Its implementation was
skewed as it mediated well in the Northern part of Nigeria with marginal presence
in the Southern part. In all, it merely served to help perpetuate and legitimize
Abacha’s regime in Nigeria, who died in oﬃce in 1998.
In General Abdulsalami Abubakar’s attempt to administer the privatization
program, he aﬃrmed in his independence speech of October 1, 1998 that “the
public sector investments in the provision of services, utilities and goods have
yielded little dividends.”51 He subsequently set up the Bureau of Public enterprises
(BPE) to oversee the supervision of the sale of these public enterprises. The exercise
did not gain popular support because of the command nature of the military and
the incoming civilian administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo literally
scrapped the Abubakar privatization program.

The Neoliberal Agenda of the Obasanjo Years
By 1999, the annual Gross Domestic product (GDP) in Nigeria averaged 2.25
percent while population growth averaged 2.8 percent. This mismatch was a
guarantee of mass poverty as the index was put at 67 percent, meaning no less
than eighty million Nigerians were absolutely poor. The cumulative eﬀects of
years of mis-governance had translated to economic stagnation, marked by a
low GDP, galloping inflation, high unemployment, falling per capita income,
48
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an energy crisis, and declining industrial capacity. Thus, in 1999, Obasanjo
inherited not only a fragile state and economy, but also a political economy driven
cyclically by trade shocks brought about by its dependence on oil. The regime
also inherited a collapsed industrial support infrastructure.52 The dysfunctional
state of federal utilities, which had been organizationally crippled by corruption,
ineﬃciency, and indebtedness, with many of them not having audited accounts
for many years, eventually informed Olusegun Obasanjo’s adoption of neoliberal
principles. Obasanjo invited the IMF and the World Bank to help provide second
level quality checks for his macroeconomic policies. Specifically, he invited the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the Bretton
Woods institutions to advise the nation on privatization.53 According to the Bureau
for Public Enterprises (BPE), the IFC served as the sole adviser of the Federal
Government with respect to the eﬀective implementation of its privatization
program from its inception in 1999.54 However the IFC pulled out of Nigeria in
early 2001. It cited the auction of Nigeria’s international air traﬃc rights by the
Nigerian government as one of the main reasons for its withdrawal.55 Based on
these challenges, Obasanjo justified his privatization program as an exercise that
would reposition the government to concentrate resources on its core functions
and responsibilities while enforcing rules and policies so that markets can work
eﬃciently. The objective was to make the government leaner and more eﬃcient,
reduce waste and corruption, free up resources tied down by public enterprises,
and improve service delivery to the people. It was hoped that privatization would
introduce new capital, technical, and managerial eﬃciency in the privatized
enterprises, thereby reviving them, creating new jobs, and adding value to the
economy. A fundamental plank for implementation of the neoliberal ideology is
the Public-Private Partnership, an alternative source of infrastructure financing,
which is rooted in a complex but contractual relationship between government
and private sector organizations. Here, the private sector makes available the
social welfare services, and the government simply regulates such services and
provides an enabling environment. Just as Hanson and Hentz linked the adoption

52

The Nation Newspaper (Lagos), May 29, 2001, 36.
The Guardian Newspaper (Lagos) April 6, 2002.
54
Samuel Aluko, “Federal Reform Agenda and the Nigerian Economy, 1999-2007: A Critical
Assessment,”2008, accessed January 23, 2013,
http://www.nigerianmuse.com/opessays/?u=Sam_Aluko_Federal_Government_Reform_
Agenda_and_the_Nigerian_Economy_1999_2007_A_Critical_Assessment.htm.
55
In excerpts of a letter to Obasanjo, IFC vice president Peter Woicke said that “the
opportunity for a successful near-term privatisation of Nigeria Airways has been diminished
by the auctioning act,” accessed April 15, 2013, http://www.ipsnews.net/2001/05/financenigeria-international-finance-corporation-pulls-out-of-privatisation-venture/.
53

Journal of Retracing Africa, Volume 1, Issue 1, Spring 2014
http://encompass.eku.edu/jora/

Ekanade | 15
of neoliberal policies in South Africa and Zambia to domestic dynamics within
those jurisdictions, Nigeria’s adoption of neoliberal principles followed the same
logic because the policy obtained domestic support from the emerging middle and
elite class, as they possessed the finance capital to buy into the privatized firms,
with little or no support from the masses who saw it as further impoverishment.
The template for the framework of the economic reform agenda of President
Obasanjo was largely influenced by the IMF and World Bank (WB).56 Their core
prescriptions for Nigeria were: (a) Unbundling and privatization of the state
electricity company; (b) Legislation and technical assistance to promote domestic
gas sector reforms; (c) Liberalization of the down stream petroleum sector; (d)
Funding to address key infrastructure constraints; and (e) Legislations for bill
on fiscal responsibility, procurement and the extractive industries transparency
initiative. To drive this reform agenda, technocrats from these international
financial institutions who had neoliberal inclinations were brought on board
of President Obasanjo’s economic team. They included Ngozi Okonjo Iweala,
Oby Ezekwesili, and Soludo Charles who later became Governor of the Central
Bank of Nigeria. Their policy agenda was encapsulated in National Economic
Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS). The IMF and World Bank were
heavily involved in funding the reform agenda. Since 2001, the World Bank has
given approximately $300 million in International Development Association (IDA)
credits for reform and privatization of Nigeria’s energy sector. However, the key
ingredients of the International Financial Institution’s policy advice meant to
shape Nigeria’s economic policies have so far led to a dysfunctional electricity
privatization process failing to eﬀectively provide pro-poor energy and encouraged
kleptocracy in the oil sector as they helped in perpetuating the conditions that
enable companies operating in the Niger Delta to maintain a monopoly over the
country’s natural resources.57
On privatization, Nigeria started a four-phased privatization program in
July 1999. The first phase involved the sale of the government’s shareholdings in a
dozen of commercially viable enterprises, including banks, petroleum marketing,
cement, and insurance companies. This was completed in December 2000. The
second phase, which was to be completed in 2001, rather started late. One salutary
impact of privatization was that all economic sectors and activities were exposed
to competition and private initiative. Privatization has created a large pool of
56
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new shareholders in Nigeria, bridging both income and geopolitical divides. It
has changed the structure and depth of the Nigerian capital market and created
awareness of the virtue of shared ownership as a form of savings. The program
has relieved the federal government of the huge and growing burden of financing
debts and deficits of public enterprises. It has in a way improved the allocative
eﬃciency of the national economy and enhanced the volume of corporate taxes
accruing in the national treasury.58
The downside of the privatization played out with the dynamics of the
privatization of Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (NITEL) a key item in the
second phase.59 The Obasanjo regime in February 2001 successfully auctioned
three Global Satellite Mobile (GSM) licenses and got expressions of interest from
strategic investors in NITEL. However ten years down the line, eﬀorts at selling
NITEL had been bungled repeatedly as China Unicom, the preferred bidder, had
not been able to raise suﬃcient funds to unbundle and revitalize it.60 NITEL was
hastily sold to Transcorp which rationalized NITEL staﬀ by 70 percent, that is
7,000 of the 10,000 staﬀ were retrenched because of the privatization exercise. ExPresident Obasanjo handed Transcorp back to the late President Yar’adua on May
27, 2007.61 The Obasanjo (1999-2007) regime virtually sealed the destruction of
the land telephony system in order to privatize it. In other countries, particularly
the industrialized ones, the land telephony is the main communication system
with the mobile telephone system serving as a subsidiary and emergency outfit to
complement the land telephone system.
The mobile telephone system has taken away much revenue from Nigerians
and from the economy to their providers within and outside Nigeria. The flight
of capital it has occasioned is excessive and most of the employment they created
is in the informal sector. By 1999, the estimated share of the urban labor force in
the informal sector in Lagos, Nigeria was 50 percent, Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, 31
percent, Nairobi, Kenya 44 percent and Tunis, Tunisia 34 percent. Nigeria had the
highest figure.62 Under Obasanjo, the informal sector thrived and witnessed real
explosion in the mid-2000s as an enormous proportion of Nigeria’s population was
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employed in this sector. This was parallel to the development of the crisis and the
implementation of the SAP that led to massive layoﬀs. The share of people in the
informal economy in Nigeria is one of the highest in Africa and represented nearly
75 percent of non-oil GNP in 2003. This is a typical indicator of poverty63. The
world development indicator also gives credence to this assertion as employmentto-population ratio in Nigeria fell from 52 percent in 1991 to 51 percent in 2007,
and the population below global poverty line remained at an all-time high of 86.4
percent.64
Nigeria entered the third phase of privatization in 2004 by privatizing
nineteen enterprises. In 2005, it entered the fourth phase under Irene Chigbue,
privatizing forty six enterprises and thirty eight others in 2006. In the fourth
phase, major utilities such as the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN)
was unbundled into seventeen successor companies and established the National
Electricity Regulation Commission (NERC), which set the framework and
paved the way for the privatization of the electricity sector.65 Up to 2005, about
N225 billion of taxpayers’ funds were pumped into the power sector to revive
it alongside the unbundling program66. The result however is that the reforms
in the power sector have not translated into any meaningful changes. Power
supplies remained epileptic as no conscious attempts were made to build new
power generation and transmission plants. This development has had adverse
eﬀects on the manufacturing sector and small scale businesses where production
cost is high thereby making finished goods uncompetitive with their imported
counterparts. Another fall out of the spasmodic nature of the public power supply
in Nigeria is the job loss in the manufacturing sector. This has been massive given
the exorbitant production costs. In addition, considering the huge population
trapped in the informal sector, a substantial number of these artisans depend on
electricity to run their businesses. With frequent power outages, and the hike in
power tariﬀs by President Goodluck Jonathan (from N8.00 to N40.00 per kilowatt)67
the challenges of the masses is further compounded, and they are left jobless. A
substantial number have resorted to criminal activities in the nation. This explains
in part why arson, kidnapping, and other criminal activities and social vices are
thriving in the Niger Delta region and other parts of the Nigerian state.
It is also important to note that the Obasanjo regime’s inability to handle
63
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problems in the power sector defeated its initiative of an export substitution policy
in Nigeria.68 In fact, the import substitution industries (ISI) policy is the preferred
model for development in advanced economies as it encourages local production
instead of the importation of essential products. In terms of economic performance,
the structural transformation of Nigeria has been slow in the area of privatization.
Privatization itself has not worked well because of bad governance, corruption,
non-tariﬀ barriers, and an inadequate regulatory framework.69
In his last days in oﬃce President Obasanjo, sold the Kaduna and Port
Harcourt refineries valued at $800 billion in May 2007 for a paltry $500 million
to Blue Star Oil Service Limited, a consortium close to him.70 In addition, Eleme
Petrochemicals Plant in Port Harcourt, the largest of its kind in Africa was sold for
$225 million, an amount not even worth its spare parts. The unfortunate aspect
is that the Nigerian government was supposed to maintain a minimum share of
49 percent. However, Indorama, the buyer was given a 75 percent equity stake
in Eleme. The same occurred with the sale of Egbin Power Station, (the largest
generating station operated by Power Holding Corporation of Nigeria) which was
also grossly underpriced and sold oﬀ at a paltry N280 million or $2 million.71
Interestingly, the Nigerian Senate committee investigating the privatization
of public enterprises since 1999 came up with appalling revelations about the
Obasanjo regime. The committee discovered, through its public hearing that the
regime sold the Aluminum Smelting Company of Nigeria built at the cost of $3.2
billion to Russal, a Russian firm at the cost of $250 million. Only $130 million
of the said $250 million has been paid, leaving a balance of $120 million, which
was supposed to be used to dredge the Imo River as stated in the share purchase
agreement. Six years after the sale, the dredging is yet to begin and the government
has not been paid the balance of the money. In addition, no one has queried Russal
for failing to fulfill its obligations. Even if the cost of building the smelter was
inflated through the procurement process, there is no justifiable reason why an
asset worth $3.2 billion should be sold for $250 million.72
Delta Steel Company Limited presents another dimension of the fraud
and irregularities involved in the sale of Nigeria’s public enterprises under the
Obasanjo regime. Global Steel Infrastructure Limited, a company that did not
participate in the bidding process, except that it submitted an expression of
68
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interest, was declared the winner. BUA, which did the follow up with a technical
bid, did not get the benefit of the bid. The then Director General of the BPE, Julius
Bala rationalized this untoward act with the assertion that “there is a diﬀerence
between ‘the winner of a bid’ and ‘the preferred winner’ as there is the need for
approval from council.”73 To compound matters, Delta Steel was valued by BPE at
N225 billion but was sold for a paltry N 4.5 billion. These privatized enterprises
have not added any meaningful value to the state and people of Nigeria.
A total sum of N146.6 billion earned from the privatization process has been
remitted to the coﬀers of the Nigerian government since 1999. This is a paltry
sum considering that investments by the government in these enterprises run
into trillions of naira. The assets of the privatized enterprises were deliberately
undervalued, as rules and regulations governing the due process were subverted,
and this has allowed corruption to fester. Those who withstand the worst of the
government’s ineptitude now are the masses in the Nigerian state.74

Neoliberalism and Constitutionalism
The Nigerian state embraced planned and balanced economic development
before 1985. Systematic development plans were made. Planning of the Nigerian
economy ceased when the Babangida regime introduced the IMF and World Bank
imposed SAPs in 1986. However, poor economic planning has been more greatly
accentuated since 1999, through the deregulation, privatization, and downsizing
of the public service and general reform agenda of the Obasanjo regime, all
encapsulated in his National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy
(NEEDS).75 The economic philosophy of the government was hinged on the fact
that the “market” has violated the Nigerian constitution, not only by abdicating
the control of the major sectors of the Nigerian economy, but also by oﬀering
Nigeria for sale to domestic and foreign private interests. By 2006, the government
had divested from 116 enterprises.76 President Obasanjo’s government’s economic
philosophy was premised on the mistaken assumption that, for the federal
government to govern eﬃciently, it had to concentrate solely on governance. It
neglected the fact that a government that cannot manage an industry successfully
cannot govern eﬃciently.77
Part of the fallout of the privatization program which has been unpopular
with the Nigerian citizenry include the reversal of pension benefits of public
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servants under the Pension Reform Act of 2004 and the deduction from their
monthly wages for pension. Equally appalling are the non-payment of pensions and
gratuities, the non-creation of employment opportunities and the non-payment of
unemployment benefits to those forced into unemployment. 78 These are violations
of Article 16, section 2(d) of the Nigerian Constitution.79 The imposition of a
contributory pension scheme on public servants in the name of pension reform is
a violation of Article 173 of the Constitution, which seeks to protect the existing
pension rights of public servants.80 In the words of Lai Olurode, when pension
rights are not guaranteed, individuals exercise no scruples at engaging in corrupt
behavior in order to make ends meet. Thus, the denial of pension rights has further
deepened the challenge of endemic corruption prevalent in Nigeria
The neoliberal agenda of the Obasanjo regime also went against the spirit
and tenets of the Constitution on issues of educational objectives of the country.
Article 18, section 3 of the 1999 Constitution provides that government shall
strive to eradicate illiteracy and to this end, government shall, as and when
practicable, provide, free compulsory and universal primary education, free
secondary education, free university education and free adult literacy program.81
However, the government worked at cross purposes by introducing public-private
partnership (PPP) administration in unity schools (public schools). Fees were
consequently introduced in primary and secondary schools and, very exorbitant
fees in tertiary institutions alongside private universities. While the introduction
of fees progressively were reduced, budgetary allocation for education fell from
11.2 percent in 1999 to 1.8 percent in 2003, all against UNESCO’s recommendation
of 26 percent for developing countries. Budgetary shortfalls undermined
productivity of Nigerian intellectuals, starved knowledge institutions of vital
resources for research, and adversely aﬀected the quality of teaching and learning.
Cumulatively, it has led to the peripheralization for the country’s intellectual
community as an aspect of the general strategy of strengthening neocolonial
imperialism in Nigeria. Furthermore, it has created a knowledge weak Nigerian
state in a century that is knowledge driven. 82 Overall, the cumulative impact of all
these actions and inactions of government are that education at all levels is now
becoming increasingly less and less available to a decreasing percentage of the
Nigerian population, further deepening the impoverishment of not just the people
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but also the nation as a whole. Thus, Nigeria stands the risk of being delinked from
the gains and prospects of an increasingly globalized and competitive world.

Retrenchment in the Public Sector and Precarization of Labor
From the outset, a central thrust of neoliberal policies was wage and social
austerity for workers to restore the profitability of capitalist firms and the capacity
of the state to assist in economic restructuring.83 In line with this thinking, since the
inception of the Obasanjo regime in 1999, about 4.8 million Nigerians in the civil
service, statutory corporations, state owned companies, in the banks, and insurance
companies have been retrenched through the reform agenda of re-engineering the
public sector of the economy and minimizing the economic role of government.
It has continued to place emphasis on the private sector as the engine of growth
of the Nigerian economy, whereas the private sector in Nigeria is very weak
and depends on the public sector for its survival and continued growth. Given
the warped reform policy, the downsizing of the public sector has consequently
led to the downsizing of the private sector, because the economic managers in
government do not appreciate that a decelerating public sector also leads to a
decelerating private sector, and vice versa. All sensible reformers in history have
increased rather than reduced employment quantum in very significant manner.
Neoliberalism, market fundamentalism, privatization, commercialization, and
minimization of the role of the government in the economy do not collectively
oﬀer eﬀective results for reducing poverty, because they do not suﬃciently build
or rebuild human capital. The type of privatization pursued by the successive
Nigerian regimes has allowed cronyism, the plundering of national assets for the
benefit of the few in the elite class. 84 The policy model itself oﬀers very little and
warrants little or no support as a suﬃcient economic policy directive for serious
people-oriented policies. It does not address nor promote equitable income
distribution, or a decent economic and social environment. The regime overlooked
the political and social context of the malfunctioning public service. The reforms
do not address substantive issues of equity and social justice in light of the
distributive consequences of the restructuring. Consequently, the mere change of
ownership from public to private has not guaranteed change in productivity and
eﬃciency. This is besides the question of corruption and institutional crisis, which
may equally bedevil a private company. In fact, several private firms have not
performed much better than public companies in Nigeria 85
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Most of the resources derived from privatizing public enterprises, for
instance, has not been directed toward building human capital through education
and training, to stimulate productivity in the economy. Retrenchment of workers
with productive application of revenue further depressed the economy. In an ideal
situation, new competent workers would be employed and that would stimulate
the economy. Downsizing of the public sector has negative multiplier eﬀects.
Retrenchment leads to reduced consumer demand, which reduces the propensity
to produce, and in turn leads to a reduction in the rate of growth of the gross
domestic product. It is a suicidal economic policy.
Nigeria’s adoption of the New Economic Partnership for Development
(NEPAD), which is based on some classic pillars of neoliberal economic policies,
helps to dramatize the negative impact of privatization, using the activities of
South African firms in Nigeria as a case study. 86 NEPAD was adopted by African
states in October 2001 with the objective of regenerating and integrating African
economies.87 Under Obasanjo’s regime, then South African President Thabo Mbeki
surreptitiously used NEPAD as a platform to open up Nigeria’s economy to South
African investments and exports. The implications of this South African penetration
have been inimical to the robust growth of the Nigerian economy. Joseph Stiglitz,
a renowned economist and Nobel Prize winner, aﬃrmed that neither theory nor
economic evidence supports the claim that opening up your market can assure
robust economic growth.88 A case in point is the Nigerian telecommunication sector
where the South African firm, MTN is about the biggest player. MTN obtained its
operating license in Nigeria in 2001 after paying over $285 million as license fee
and another $1 billion to set up operations. In 2004 alone, MTN recorded an after
tax profit of over $2.4 billion in Nigeria.89 This amounts to over profiteering and
massive exploitation of Nigerians who are the subscribers.
A number of South African companies have also entered the fast food business
in Nigeria, controlling almost 50 percent of the international fast food franchises
in Nigeria. They are also making huge profits. In the media and entertainment
industry in Nigeria, a South African company such as DSTV accounts for 80
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percent of the viewers that watch satellite television in Nigeria.90 Despite all these
investments by South Africa in Nigeria, the people of Nigeria have not benefitted
much. This is partly because South African corporations operating in Nigeria are
allowed to repatriate the profits they make out of Nigeria. The majority of South
African firms in Nigeria also source most of the products that they use or sell in
Nigeria through South Africa and not locally, negating the creation of upstream or
downstream industries in Nigeria. South African companies operating in Nigeria
have also created very few jobs. The few they have created have tended to be
casual. Though not peculiar to South African companies, many Nigerians who
work in South African owned firms have been denied the right to join trade unions.
For example, MTN has only about 500 permanent jobs.91 Most of its employees are
casual or temporary workers.

Conclusion
Nigeria’s National Development Plans between 1962 and 1980 emphasized the
central role of the government in economic planning. This ensured progressive
development and stability of the economy and society. Military intervention
truncated the entire process as it progressively eclipsed public provision of social
welfare services, substituted it with ad-hoc welfare structures to legitimize and
perpetuate successive military rules, setting in motion the wholesale marketization
of social welfare services. The neoliberal orthodoxy was perpetuated paradoxically
by subsequent democratic regimes without the consent of the citizens. The
civil regimes privatized the state and substituted public good as private good,
overlooking the fact that governance is a social contract in which the individual
abrogates some of his rights to the state and in return enjoys some social benefits,
which fundamentally include protection of life, human dignity, and social welfare.
The neglect of the welfare of the citizenry has contributed immensely to the crisis
of development. More importantly, the proponents of neoliberal policies have
confessed that they did not consider the African or Asian economic scenes when
they propounded their economic manifesto, believing same to be valid for all
places and at all times. The proponents also admit that liberalization does not
necessarily imply a swing to market fundamentalism and a minimalist role for
government.92 For instance, the sponsors of the Bretton Woods institutions ensure
that neoliberalism coexists with strong protectionism and a desire to heavily
subsidize some markets in the United States.93 Neoliberalism has promoted
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various lock-in mechanisms to insulate economic policy from democratic rule
and popular accountability. This has encouraged capital flight, authoritarianism,
corruption, the mushrooming of the informal sector, coupled with unprecedented
casualization and precarization of labor. All of these have cumulatively deepened
poverty and crime in Nigeria, thus undermining the very essence of a democratic
state which ought to uphold social rights.
Rather than stick to the principles outlined by the Bretton Woods institutions,
a new economic policy should be employed that more adequately reflects the goals
of development and enhances the chances of local rather than foreign ownership
of the means of production for more rapid and equitable economic growth. The
government must practice home-grown development policies that fulfil the
developmental aspirations of the masses. Under the reign of neoliberalism in
Nigeria, capital and wealth have been largely distributed upwards, while civic
virtues have been undermined by a mindless celebration of the free market as
the model for organizing all facets of everyday life. Under attack is the social
contract with its emphasis on enlarging the public good and expanding social
provisions such as access to adequate health care, housing, employment, public
transportation, and education, all of which provided both safety nets and a set of
conditions upon which democracy could be experienced and critical citizenship
engaged.94
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